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LANGUAGE THAT LIMITS EMPLOYER 

LIABILITY IN MASSACHUSETTS 

JOHN J. FERRITER'" 
INTRODUCrION"'''' 
As a general rule, people should choose their words carefully. 
However, where employment law is concerned, this maxim is criti­
cal. Cases have been decided based entirely upon the use of spe­
cific words in an employment relationship. This Article addresses 
various methods of avoiding employer liability throughout the em­
ployment relationship, and includes discussions of employer con­
duct: during the solicitation of employees, during the interviewing 
process, during employment, and after the employment of a partic­
ular individual ends. What follows is a discussion of language em­
ployers should use, language employers should avoid, and 
suggestions intended to help employers legally obtain information 
about employees, simply by using the proper language. 
I. HELP WANTED ADVERTISEMENTS 
Employers frequently solicit employees through the use of help 
wanted advertisements. However, such advertisements, if improp­
erly drafted, may expose employers to potential liability. Help 
wanted advertisements present the unusual situation in which an 
employer attempts to present a position in a favorable light while at 
the same time seeking to avoid liability. For example, an employer 
does not want to commit to so many details that the advertisement 
presents a legal "offer" that can be legally "accepted" simply by 
filling out the application. If such an "offer" were presented, basic 
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contract principles would allow acceptance according to the terms 
of the advertisement.1 
Fortunately for employers, the general rule is that an advertise­
ment will not constitute an offer.2 However, courts in some states 
have held that help wanted advertisements containing specific 
te~s may bind employers to the language of the advertisement.3 
In fact, even ambiguous language has been construed against em­
ployers in certain jurisdictions.4 
Not only do preparers of help wanted advertisements need to 
be aware of the specificity of language used, but they must also ex­
ercise care to avoid language that could be construed as discrimina­
tory. "It is well settled that Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act] 
prohibits an employer from indicating a preference based on sex in 
its advertisements ...."5 However, there is some question as to 
whether employers can use sex-referent language such as "patrol­
man" or "metermaid" when soliciting employees.6 Due to this un­
certainty, an employer's best course of action may be to replace all 
such terminology with sex-neutral terms. 
Another area of concern arises in the context of individuals 
with disabilities. For instance, employers must ensure that posi­
tions, as advertised, are accessible to all individuals, including those 
with disabilities.? In fact, employers must ensure that the adver­
1. See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAcrs § 41, at 68 (one vol. ed.1952) 
("When an offer has been made by publication, to a large number of unidentified per­
sons, a power of acceptance is created in all those who read it."). 
2. See id. § 25, at 43 ("It is quite possible to make a definite and operative offer 
... by advertisement, in a newspaper ... or on a placecard in a store window. It is not 
customary to do this, however, and the presumption is the other way."). 
3. See Willis v. Allied Insulation Co., 174 So. 2d 858, 860-61 (La. Ct. App. 1965) 
(deciding that a newspaper help wanted advertisement reading "[p]rofessional training 
program w/$450.00 monthly guarantee if qualified" constituted a binding employment 
contract when the plaintiff answered the advertisement and was accepted for the 
position). 
4. See id. at 861 (citing Johnson v. Capital City Ford Co., 85 So. 2d 75 (La. Ct. 
App. 1955)). 
5. EEOC: Policy Guide on Sex-Referent Language in Job Advertising, 8 Lab. ReI. 
Rep. (BNA) (405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man.) 6847, 6847 (Apr. 16,1990) [hereinafter EEOC 
Policy Guide]; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
6. See EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 5, at 6847-48. The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission appears to believe that the use of some terms, such as "chair­
man," may be acceptable. This stems from the fact that such terms have gained a collo­
quial status wherein they are frequently used to refer to any individual, male or female. 
See id. at 6847. However, use of terms which can be interpreted solely as applying to 
one sex may be deemed discriminatory. See id. at 6847 n.2 (using the terms "waitress" 
and "waiter" as examples). . 
7. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(3) (1996). 
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tisements themselves are accessible to those with disabilities; it 
should be noted that there is no obligation, in advance, to provide 
advertisements in various formats, but employers must make acces­
sible formats available upon request.s 
Unless preparers of help wanted advertisements address these 
concerns, employer liability may exist. In fact, after employers re­
ceive responses from prospective employees, they must continue to 
exercise care during the application process as well. The following 
section discusses specific instances of the application process where 
there exists the potential for employer liability. 
II. EMPLOYMENT ApPLICATIONS 
An employment application is a device that employers use to 
gather important, usually personal, information about prospective 
employees. Unfortunately for employers, a number of federal and 
state laws limit the type of information that an employment applica­
tion may seek to obtain.9 As a result, requesting certain improper 
information can subject an employer to liability. 
While not all inclusive, information that employers should ex­
ercise care in inquiring about during the application and hiring 
processes are discussed in the following sections. Among the areas 
where care must be exercised are the following: criminal records, lie 
detector tests, commercial vehicle operation experience, and volun­
teer work. 
A. Criminal Records 
Many employers attempt to discover whether an applicant for 
employment has a criminal record. However, it is important to re­
alize that if an application asks about criminal convictions, the ap­
plication also must include the following language: 
"An applicant for employment with a sealed record on file with 
the commissioner of probation may answer 'no record' with re­
spect to an inquiry herein relative to prior arrests, criminal court 
appearances or convictions. An applicant for employment with a 
sealed record on file with the commissioner of probation may an­
swer 'no record' to an inquiry herein relative to prior arrests or 
8. See EEOC: Technical Assistance on Title I of ADA, 8 Lab. ReI. Rep. (BNA) 
(405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man.) 6981, 7027 (Jan. 27, 1992) [hereinafter ADA Assistance 
Manual]. 
9. See infra Part II.A-E for a discussion of the limits on information which an 
application may seek to obtain. 
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criminal court appearances. In addition, any applicant for em­
ployment may answer 'no record' with respect to any inquiry rel­
ative to prior arrests, court appearances and adjudications in all 
cases of delinquency or as a child in need of services which did 
not result in a complaint transferred to the superior court for 
criminal prosecution."lO 
Under Massachusetts law, it is unlawful for an employer to in­
quire about an applicant's criminal history unless the employer lim­
its his inquiry to criminal conduct that occurred within five years of 
the time of application.ll After five years, the applicant has a right 
to withhold such information from the employer if the applicant so 
chooses. In regard to past criminal conduct, the General Laws of 
Massachusetts provide that it shall be unlawful 
[f]or an employer, himself or through his agent, in connection 
with an application for employment ... to request any informa­
tion, to make or keep a record of such information, to use any 
form of application or application blank which requests such in­
formation, or to exclude, limit or otherwise discriminate against 
any person by reason of his or her failure to furnish such infor­
mation through a written application or oral inquiry or otherwise 
regarding: (i) an arrest, detention, or disposition regarding any 
violation of law in which no conviction resulted, or (ii) a first 
conviction for any of the following misdemeanors: drunkenness, 
simple assault, speeding, minor traffic violations, affray, or distur­
bance of the peace, or (iii) any conviction of a misdemeanor 
where the date of such conviction or the completion of any pe­
riod of incarceration resulting therefrom, whichever date is later, 
occurred five or more years prior to the date of such application 
for employment or such request for information, unless such per­
son has been convicted of any offense within five years immedi­
ately preceding the date of such application for employment or 
such request for information.12 
Accordingly, it is unlawful to elicit such information from the 
applicant. 
Nonetheless, it is not unlawful for an employer to gather the 
same information through the use of the Criminal History Systems 
Board, a board established by the laws of Massachusetts to exercise 
10. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (1996). It should be noted that the repeti­
tive language of the statute stems from a poorly drafted amendment to the provision in 
1973. See An Act Providing for the Sealing of Certain Records of Conviction for the 
Possession of Marihuana, 1973 Mass. Acts 1164. 
11. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, §4(9) (1996). 
12. [d. 
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control over the criminal offender record information system and 
access to this information.13 Under the Criminal Offenders Record 
Information Act ("CORI Act"),14 eligibility to receive such infor­
mation is limited to law enforcement officials and some potential 
employers.15 If the board determines that the need for criminal rec­
ord information outweighs the individual's privacy and security in­
terests, the board will certify a requesting employer eligible to 
receive such information.16 In Bynes v. School Committee,17 two 
school bus drivers were terminated because of their past criminal 
records.1s The school committee had requested criminal records 
from the Criminal History Systems Board, pursuant to the CORI 
Act, for each of the districts' bus drivers.19 The plaintiffs contended 
that the school committee violated chapter 151B, section 4(9) of the 
General Laws of Massachusetts, when it sought information under 
the CORI Act.20 However, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court disagreed with the plaintiffs' interpretation of the statute, 
choosing instead to interpret the statute narrowly.21 The court held 
that the legislative intent of the statute was "merely to protect em­
ployees from requests from their employers and not to proscribe 
employers from seeking such information elsewhere. "22 Thus, it is 
clear that if an employer wishes to lawfully retrieve the criminal 
histories of its applicants or employees while avoiding liability, the 
employer must do so by means other than inquiring with the em­
ployee directly. 
B. Polygraph Tests 
In certain circumstances, employers may wish to inquire about 
a prospective employee's past through the use of a polygraph, or lie 
detector, test in order to assess the honesty and trustworthiness of 
the applicant. In Massachusetts, however, it is unlawful to request 
13. See Bynes v. School Comm., 411 Mass. 264, 268-69, 581 N.E.2d 1019, 1021-22 
(1991); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 168 (1996). 
14. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 167-172 (1996). 
15. See id. § 172. 
16. See id. § 172; see'also Bynes, 411 Mass. at 265, 581 N.E.2d at 1020. 
17. 411 Mass. 264, 581 N.E.2d 1019 (1991). 
18. See id. at 264-65, 581 N.E.2d at 1020. 
19. See id. at 265, 581 N.E.2d at 1020. 
20. See id. at 266-67, 581 N.E.2d at 1020-21. 
21. See id. at 267, 581 N.E.2d at 1021. 
22. Id. at 268, ;;81 N.E.2d at 1021. 
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that an applicant undergo such a test.23 In fact, employment appli­
cations are required to include the following language: "It is unlaw­
ful in Massachusetts to require or administer a lie detector test as a 
condition of employment or continued employment. An employer 
who violates this law shall be subject to criminal penalties and civil 
liability."24 
Federal law also prohibits employers engaged in or affecting 
commerce25 from compelling employees or applicants to submit to 
a lie detector test.26 Further, federal law makes it unlawful for an 
employer to use, accept, refer to, or inquire concerning the results 
of such tests. Federal law exempts certain employers from these 
prohibitions: government employers, national defense and security 
employers, FBI contractors, security services, and employers au­
thorized to manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled 
substances.27 
Under federal law, an employer may request an employee to 
submit to a lie detector test if it is administered pursuant to an 
ongoing investigation involving economic injury or loss to the em­
ployer's business, if the employee had access to the property in 
question, and there is a reasonable suspicion that the employee was 
involved in the injury or 10ss.28 Before such a polygraph test may 
be administered, the employer must provide the employee with a 
statement setting forth the incident being investigated, a description 
of the employer's reasonable suspicions, and a statement indicating 
the employee's access to the property.29 
23. Chapter 149, section 19B(1) of the General Laws of Massachusetts defines lie 
detector tests as 
any test utilizing a polygraph or any other device, mechanism, instrument or 
written examination, which is operated, or the results of which are used or 
interpreted by an examiner for the purpose of purporting to assist in or enable 
the detection of deception, the verification of truthfulness, or the rendering of 
a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty of an individual. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 19B(1) (1996). 
24. Id. § 19B(2)(b). 
25. The phrase "engaged in or affecting commerce" has historically been inter­
preted broadly so that courts will almost always determine that an employer is engaged 
in or affecting commerce. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (interpreting a statute regulating all activity that affects interstate 
commerce as showing congressional intent to reach as far as the commerce clause per­
mits, and holding that the commerce clause permits Congress to forbid a policy of seg­
regation, even at a local hotel). 
26. See 29 U.S.c. §§ 2001-2009 (1994). 
27. See id. § 2006. 
28. See id. § 2006(d). 
29. See id. 
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Violations of the polygraph laws carry different penalties at the 
state and federal level. For violating Massachusetts law, an em­
ployer subjects itself to fines of not less than $300 nor more than 
$1,500, and possible imprisonment for not more than 90 days, de­
pending on the number of offenses.30 Under federal law, a $10,000 
penalty can be assessed against an employer for unlawfully compel­
ling polygraphs.31 As such, the employer would be well advised to 
take caution and seek legal counsel before requiring an employee 
or potential employee to submit to a polygraph examination. 
C. Commercial Motor Vehicle Operators 
In certain circumstances, an application may ask about the ap­
plicant's commercial motor vehicle experience. These applications 
usually ask for a list of employers for whom the applicant has 
worked as a commercial motor vehicle operator during the past ten 
years, including the dates of employment and reasons for leaving.32 
Employers typically require verification of the applicant's commer­
cial motor vehicle work experience in order to protect themselves 
from liability created by Massachusetts statutes. 
Specifically, chapter 90F, section 4 of the General Laws of 
Massachusetts makes an employer liable for knowingly allowing, 
permitting, or authorizing any applicant to operate a commercial 
motor vehicle during any period in which the driver has lost the 
privilege in any state to drive a commercial motor vehicle. The stat­
ute mandates that the employer must "knowingly" authorize such a 
violation,33 and therefore employers must educate themselves as to 
an applicant's legitimate qualifications to operate a commercial mo­
tor vehicle. To avoid "knowingly" violating the statute, employers 
should require applicants to certify the truthfulness of information 
given regarding the past operation of commercial motor vehicles. 
Requiring such certification from the applicant is evidence that the 
employer affirmatively exercised reasonable diligence to ensure 
that the applicant possessed a valid, active license to operate a com­
mercial motor vehicle, thereby negating the inference that the em­
ployer "knowingly" violated the statute. 
30. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 19B(3) (1996). 
31. See 29 V.S.c. § 2005(a)(1). 
32. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90F, § 4 (1996). 
33. Id. 
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D. Volunteer Work 
Employment applications often ask about a candidate's prior 
work history. Massachusetts law mandates that applications asking 
about a prior work history must affirmatively state that the appli­
cant is permitted to include volunteer work that may be verified as 
part of the applicant's work history.34 
Beyond this application stage of the employment relationship, 
there remains the potential for employer liability. For instance, fol­
lowing the application process, employers typically interview pro­
spective employees, and in so doing, subject themselves to potential 
liability. The following sections describe the proper manner to ad­
dress the concerns which an employer may have regarding the in­
terviewing process while at the same time avoiding employer 
liability. 
E. Other Language 
In addition to what is typically on an application, the employer 
should include notice of certain other topics on application forms to 
avoid inadvertently violating various federal and state laws enacted 
to protect applicants and employees. Pursuant to federal and state 
statutes, it may be in an employer's best interest to include state­
ments regarding the following areas of law: (i) equal employment 
opportunity, acknowledging that the employer will not discriminate 
on the basis of race, gender, national origin, religious beliefs, or sex­
ual preference;35 (ii) immigration reform and control, acknowledg­
ing that the employer will not knowingly hire illegal aliens;36 (iii) 
testing requirements prior to or subsequent to employment, provid­
ing applicants with notice of expected health or preference test­
34. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 52B (1996). 
35. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Section 2000e-2(a) provides the following: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. 
Id. 
36. See 8 U.S.c. § 1324(a) (1994) (prohibiting employers from knowingly hiring 
an illegal alien or not complying with verification procedures). 
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ing;37 (iv) at-will employment declaration, stating that employees 
can be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason at 
all;38 (v) statement requiring certification that the information pro­
vided by the applicant is true and complete, and providing notice to 
employees that the employer will rely on the information provided 
and that falsification thereof is cause for dismissal;39 and (vi) a 
waiver and authorization to verify information, speak to references, 
and conduct criminal and credit checks and giving the employer the 
right to obtain information from third parties.40 
By including statements regarding the above referenced topics 
on employment applications, employers ensure their compliance 
with state and federal laws, thereby avoiding potential liability. 
Further, the employer provides itself with an avenue to terminate 
the employee if the application is incorrect. 
III. THE EMPLOYMENT INTERVIEW 
Just as employers must be careful regarding the questions they 
ask on employment applications, they must also exercise care dur­
ing any personal interviews that they conduct. Precautions must be 
taken regardless of whether the interview is the result of a help 
wanted advertisement in the newspaper or an unsolicited applica­
tion for employment. 
Certain questions may not be asked during a personal inter­
view, but impermissible inquiries can often be replaced with per­
missible inquiries that reveal the information the employer wishes 
to gather. An employer should not ask if an employee has a disabil­
ity that would interfere with his or her ability to fulfill the job re­
quirements, as such a question would violate chapter 151B, section 
4(16) of the General Laws of Massachusetts.41 However, an em­
37. See Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507, 514-15 (D. 
Mass. 1974). The employer must show that any exam administered is in fact "substan­
tially related" to the job performance. Cf. Cox v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 414 Mass. 
375,380,386,607 N.E.2d 1035, 1038, 1042 (1993) (holding that the test used was related 
to job performance, and thus that it was proper to be required for the job). 
38. See Jackson v. Action for Boston Community Dev. Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 9, 525 
N.E.2d 411, 412 (1988). 
39. See generally Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th 
Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 
U.S. 352 (1995). 
40. See MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, INC., DOCUMENTING 
THE HIRING PROCESS 7 (1996). 
41. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(16) (1996). Section 4(16) provides the 
following: 
An employer may not make a preemployment inquiry of an applicant as to 
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ployer is not prohibited, either by statute or case law, from asking 
whether an applicant can perform the functions of the job with or 
without reasonable accommodation.42 
In addition, an employer should not ask how many days the 
applicant was sick last year or whether the employee ever filed a 
worker's compensation claim; such a question would violate chap­
ter 152, section 75B(2) of the General Laws of Massachusetts.43 
However, an employer is not prohibited by statute or case law from 
asking whether an employee can meet the attendance requirements 
of the job.44 
Further, an employer should not ask an applicant if he or she 
has ever been treated for an alcohol or mental health problem, or 
inquire as to what drugs the applicant is currently taking. Ques­
tions phrased in this manner may potentially violate chapter 151B, 
section 4(9A) of the General Laws of Massachusetts.45 However, 
an employer may ask an applicant about illegal drug or alcohol use 
so long as the question asked is not likely to elicit information 
about drug addiction or alcoholism, as these are disabilities covered 
by the Americans with Disabilities "Act ("ADA").46 
whether the applicant is a handicapped individual or as to the nature or sever­
ity of the handicap, except that an employer may condition an offer of employ­
ment on the results of a medical examination conducted solely for the purpose 
of determining whether the employee, with reasonable accommodation, is ca­
pable of performing the essential functions of the job, and an employer may 
invite applicants to voluntarily disclose their handicap for purposes of assisting 
the employer in its affirmative action efforts. 
Id. 
42. See EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on Pre-Employment Inquiries Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 8 Lab. ReI. Rep. (BNA) (405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man.) 
7191, 7192 (Oct. 10, 1995) [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance]; see also ADA Assist­
ance Manual, supra note 8, at 7026. 
43. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 75B(2) (1996). Section 75B(2) states that 
"[n]o employer or duly authorized agent of an employer shall discharge, refuse to hire 
or in any other manner discriminate against an employee because the employee has 
exercised a right afforded by [the worker's compensation laws]." Id. 
44. See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 42, at 7192. 
45. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(9A) (1996). Section 4(9A) provides the 
following: 
No application for employment shall contain any questions or requests for 
information regarding the admission of an applicant, on one or more occa­
sions, voluntarily or involuntarily, to any public or private facility for the care 
and treatment of mentally iII persons, provided that such applicant has been 
discharged from such public or private facility or facilities and is no longer 
under treatment directly related to such admission. 
Id. 
46. See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 42, at 7196. Nonetheless, questions 
regarding drug and alcohol use should generally be avoided due to their tendency to 
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In addition to questioning applicants, a number of employers 
require potential employees to undergo drug testing as part of the 
interviewing process.47 Employers may require drug tests if the 
work to be performed is dangerous or if there are safety, liability, 
product control, or other concerns.48 Although there are no Massa­
chusetts cases addressing the issue, courts in other jurisdictions 
have held that an employer is not required to inform the applicant 
of test results if the applicant fails the preemployment drug screen­
ing.49 Since there is no recognized duty to inform the applicant that 
he has failed a drug test, an employer's exposure to actions filed as 
a result of such a disclosure should be minimapo In fact, the 
illicit information about a disability. See id.; see also Buckley v. Consolidated Edison 
Co., 127 F.3d 270, 272-74 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing alcoholism and drug addiction and 
the circumstances under which each is a disability under the ADA). 
47. See generally Webster v. Motorola, Inc., 418 Mass. 425, 637 N.E.2d 203 (1994); 
Folmsbee v. Tech Tool Grinding & Supply, Inc., 417 Mass. 388, 630 N.E.2d 586 (1994); 
Guiney v. Police Comm'r, 411 Mass. 328,582 N.E.2d 523 (1991); O'Connor v. Police 
Comm'r, 408 Mass. 324, 557 N.E.2d 1146 (1990); Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective 
Ass'n, Inc. v. State Racing Comm'n, 403 Mass. 692, 532 N.E.2d 644 (1989). 
48. See Folmsbee, 417 Mass. at 393-94, 630 N.E.2d at 589-90 (holding that requir­
ing employees to undergo drug testing was a legitimate business interest of the defend­
ant which outweighed the plaintiff's rights to privacy when the plaintiff filed a suit 
alleging that the requirement of taking a drug test to maintain employment with the 
defendant violated the plaintiff's right to privacy under chapter 214, section 1(B) of the 
General Laws of Massachusetts); see also Webster, 418 Mass. at 431, 637 N.E.2d at 206­
07. . 
49. See Reeves v. Western Co. of N. Am., 867 S.W.2d 385, 388-91 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1993), abrogated on other grounds by Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994). 
In Reeves, the plaintiff was a prospective employee who failed a drug test and was not 
hired on account of traces of alcohol found in his urine sample. See id. at 388. When a 
second drug test was conducted on the sample, the result was again positive for alcohol. 
See id. at 389. A letter from the laboratory which accompanied the results revealed that 
there could be two separate sources of the alcohol, either direct alcohol consumption or 
sugar which is broken into alcohol due to a health problem within the body. See id. 
The plaintiff was not notified of this second test, its results, or the accompanying letter. 
Thus, he was unable to explain that he had diabetic problems that most likely would 
account for the alcohol in his urine. See id. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant 
was negligent in the manner in which it secured, tested and/or reported the test results 
of the urine sample. See id. at 390. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendant inten­
tionally inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiff's wife when she was told of the re­
sults of the test. See id. at 391. Because the court found that the employer did not owe 
a duty to the prospective employee, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was af­
firmed. See id. at 391, 397. 
50. See Doe v. Roe, Inc., 553 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (showing 
that disclosure of drug test results, however, may expose an employer to liability). In 
Doe, the employer made itself vulnerable to legal action by disclosing the results of a 
preemployment drug screening test to the plaintiff. See id. Bringing an action under 
the New York State Human Rights Laws, the plaintiff claimed that the metabolites 
found in his urine sample resulted from his consumption of bread which contained 
poppy seeds and not from unlawful opiate use. See id. The plaintiff alleged that the 
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Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Depart­
ment, declared that only when the prospective employer is "chal­
lenged" must it come forward with evidence establishing that its 
testing method accurately tested that which it was designed to 
test.51 Further, the New York court cautioned as follows: 
While employers have broad discretion in setting hiring stan­
dards and administering tests to ensure that prospective employ­
ees meet those standards, the employer must show "that the 
standard or test bears a rational relationship to and is a valid 
predictor of employee job performance, and that it does not cre­
ate an arbitrary, artificial and unnecessary barrier to employment 
which operates invidiously to discriminate on the basis of an im­
permissible classification. "52 
An employer's right to conduct drug or alcohol screening is 
based largely upon the employer's legitimate business interest so 
long as such tests are not used to achieve unlawful ends. 
Once the interview stage is completed, and the prospective em­
ployee has fulfilled the preemployment requirements, the employer 
should then contemplate reducing its exposure to liability during 
the employment relationship itself. An employer can reduce its lia­
bility through several methods, which are discussed in the following 
sections. 
IV. BEYOND THE INTERVIEW 
A. Posting Requirements 
Once an employer has hired employees, the employer must 
comply with various posting requirements. Notice of the following 
topics, which are available from appropriate federal and state agen­
cies, must be posted in a conspicuous place where employees can 
readily see them: (i) equal employment opportunity;53 (ii) job safety 
and health protections;54 (iii) fair labor standards;55 (iv) employee 
prospective employer did not use a testing method which would definitively distinguish 
the metabolites resulting from opiate use. See id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. (quoting Sontag v. Bronstein, 303 N.E.2d 405, 407 (N.Y. 1973». 
53. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.30 (1998) ("Every employer, employment agency, labor 
organization, and joint labor-management committee controlling an apprenticeship or 
other training program that has an obligation under Title VII or the ADA shall post 
and keep posted in conspicuous places upon its premises notices in an accessible format 
... describing the applicable provisions of Title VII and the ADA."). 
54. See 29 U.S.c. § 657(c)(1) (1994) (noting that the Secretary will "issue regula­
tions requiring that employers, through posting of notices or other means, keep their 
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polygraph protection;56 and family and medical leave rights. 57 
Beyond merely complying with these posting requirements, 
employers can limit their potential liability through the use of writ­
ten agreements that delineate the employment relationship. 
B. Employment Agreements that Protect Employers 
1. Non-Competition Agreements 
Employment agreements often provide significant opportuni­
ties for employers to protect business assets, including good will, 
trade secrets, and intellectual property. 58 If an employer fails to 
draft an employment agreement, an employee can "plan to go into 
competition with his employer and may take active steps to do so 
while still employed."59 Regardless of the existence of an employ-
employees informed of their protections and obligations under this chapter, including 
the provisions of applicable standards"); see also 29 c.P.R. § 1903.2(a)(1) (1998) 
("Each employer shall post and keep posted a notice or notices, to be furnished by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, informing 
employees of the protections and obligations provided for in the [Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, 29 U.s.c. §§ 651-678,] and that for assistance information ... employ­
ees should contact the employer or the nearest Office of the Department of Labor. 
Such notices shall be posted by the employer in each establishment in conspicuous 
place or places where notices to employees are customarily posted."). 
55. See 29 c.P.R. § 516.4 (1998) ("Every employer employing any employee sub­
ject to the ... minimum wage provisions [of the Pair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.c. 
§§ 201-219,] shall post and keep posted a notice explaining the Act ... in conspicuous 
places in every establishment where such employees are employed so as to permit them 
to observe readily a copy."). 
56. See id. § 801.6 ("Every employer subject to [the Employee Polygraph Protec­
tion Act, 29 U.S.c. §§ 2001-2009,] shall post and keep posted on its premises a notice 
explaining the Act, as prescribed by the Secretary. Such notice must be posted in a 
prominent and conspicuous place in every establishment of the employer where it can 
readily be observed by employees and applicants for employment."); see also 29 U.S.c. 
§ 2003 ("Each employer shall post and maintain such notice in a conspicuous place on 
its premises where notices to employees and applicants to employment are customarily 
posted."); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 19B (1996). 
57. See 29 c.P.R. § 825.300 (1998) ("Every employer covered by the [Family and 
Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.c. §§ 2601-2654,] is required to post on its premises, in con­
spicuous places where employees are employed, whether or not it has any 'eligible' 
employees, a notice explaining the Act's provisions and providing information concern­
ing the procedures for filing complaints of violations of the Act with the Wage and 
Hour Division. The notice must be posted prominently where it can be readily seen by 
employees and applicants for employment."); see also 29 U.S.c. § 2619 (1994); MAss. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105D (1996). 
58. See Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc., 409 Mass. 165, 172-73,565 N.E.2d 415, 419-20 
(1991). 
59. Id. at 172, 565 N.E.2d at 419. In Augat, the defendant was a former employee 
and future competitor of the plaintiff corporation. See id. at 166, 565 N.E.2d at 416. 
While in the plaintiffs employ, the individual defendant signed an agreement not to 
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ment agreement, however, an employee may not appropriate his 
employer's trade secrets. He may not solicit his employer's custom­
ers while still working for his employer, and he may not carry away 
certain information, such as lists of customers. In addition, such a 
person may not act for his future interests at the expense of his 
employer by using the employer's funds or employees for personal 
gain or by a course of conduct designed to hurt the employer.60 
Nonetheless, a restrictive covenant may be used to expand upon the 
protections afforded to an employer. It should be noted, however, 
that where a restrictive covenant not to compete interferes with the 
former employee's right to earn a living, the covenant will not be 
enforceable.61 
In Massachusetts, non-competition agreements are generally 
enforced if they are deemed necessary to protect legitimate busi­
ness interests, and if the language of the covenant "is reasonably 
limited in time and space, and is consonant with the public inter­
est."62 If a court finds that a non-competition covenant is over-
compete. One month after that agreement expired, he made plans to form the defend­
ant corporation while he and a current employee of the plaintiff corporation took ac­
tions to recruit key managers of the plaintiff corporation. See id. The court decided 
that while it is permissible to plan and take active steps to go into competition with an 
employer, "before he terminates his employment, a top managerial employee may not 
solicit the departure of employees to work for a competitor." Id. at 173, 565 N.E.2d at 
420. 
60. See id. at 172-73, 565 N.E.2d at 419-20. 
61. See Richmond Bros., Inc. v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 357 Mass. 106, 109-11, 
256 N.E.2d 304, 306-08 (1970). In Richmond Brothers, the plaintiff, a broadcast com­
pany sued its former employee, a radio talk show personality, alleging that the defend­
ant breached his covenant not to compete by working for a competing radio station. 
The court stated the following: 
In determining whether a restriction as to time is reasonable, we must consider 
the nature of the plaintiffs business and the character of the employment in­
volved, as well as the situation of the parties, the necessity of the restriction for 
the protection of the employer's business and the right of the employee to 
work and earn a livelihood. 
Id. at 110, 256 N.E.2d at 307. The court further noted the following: 
"[A]n employer cannot by contract prevent his employee from using the skill 
and intelligence acquired or increased and improved through experience or 
through instruction received in the course of the employment. The employee 
may achieve superiority in his particular department by every lawful means at 
hand, and then, upon the rightful termination of his contract for service, use 
that superiority for the benefit of rivals in trade of his former employer." 
Id. at 111, 256 N.E.2d at 307 (quoting Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 263 Mass. 223, 
226-27, 160 N.E.2d 804, 806 (1928». 
62. Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 342 Mass. 714, 716, 175 N.E.2d 374, 376 
(1961); see also Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 371 Mass. 643, 647, 358 N.E.2d 
804, 807 (1976). In Analogic, the plaintiff corporation employed two of the individual 
defendants during the development of an unpatented, high speed data acquisition mod­
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broad, the court may limit enforcement to a more appropriate time 
and space.63 Note however, in Massachusetts, non-competition 
agreements between physicians are unenforceable.64 
Furthermore, it is firmly established in Massachusetts law that 
when a court is determining "whether a covenant will be enforced, 
in whole or in part, the reasonable needs of the former employer 
for protection against harmful conduct of the former employee 
must be weighed against both.the reasonableness of the restraint 
imposed on the former employee and the public interest. "65 When 
ule. See id. at 645, 358 N.E.2d at 805. Development took some eighteen months and 
over $100,000 in funds. See id., 358 N.E.2d at 806. Once the module was developed, 
the two individual defendants were released from their duties at Analogic. At the time 
of their departure, the two individuals signed statements indicating that they would not 
take with them any documents or any materials belonging to Analogic. See id., 358 
N.E.2d at 806. Shortly thereafter, the two individuals, and others, formed the defend­
ant corporation for the purpose of creating a data acquisition module similar in all 
respects to that of plaintiff's Module "MP 6912." The defendants used documents, 
drawings, and a sample of the plaintiff's module to create, in just a few months and at a 
cost of approximately $2,500, a copy of the MP 6912. See id., 358 N.E.2d at 806. The 
court determined that an injunction could be issued against the defendants and that the 
time period for which it would be effective would be based upon the reasonableness of 
its scope, i.e., the length of time it would normally take for skilled engineers to dupli­
cate the product once it has been offered to the general public. See id. at 647, 358 
N.E.2d at 808. 
63. See All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 364 Mass. 773,777-78,308 N.E.2d 481, 485 
(1974) (enforcing a two-year non-competition agreement, but reducing the geographic 
area to prior sales territory). 
64. Chapter 112, section 12X of the General Laws of Massachusetts provides the 
following: 
Any contract or agreement which creates or establishes the terms of a partner­
ship, employment, or any other form of professional relationship with a physi­
cian registered to practice medicine pursuant to section two, which includes 
any restriction of the right of such physician to practice medicine in any geo­
graphic area for any period of time after the termination of such partnership, 
employment or professional relationship shall be void and unenforceable with 
respect to said restriction; provided, however, that nothing herein shall render 
void or unenforceable the remaining provisions of any such contract or 
agreement. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12X (1996); see also Falmouth Ob-Gyn Assocs. v. Abisla, 
417 Mass. 176, 179-80,629 N.E.2d 291, 293 (1994) (interpreting statute as unenforceable 
due to its compensation for competition clause as a restriction on employment). 
65. All Stainless, 364 Mass. at 778, 308 N.E.2d at 485; accord Richmond Bros., 357 
Mass. at 110, 256 N.E.2d at 307; Cedric G. Chase Photo. Lab., Inc. v. Hennessey, 327 
Mass. 137, 139, 97 N.E.2d 397, 398-99 (1951); Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. Mc­
Menamy, 290 Mass. 549, 553, 195 N.E. 747, 748 (1935); Walker Coal & Ice Co. v. West­
erman, 263 Mass. 235, 238, 160 N.E. 801, 802 (1928); see also RESTATEMENT OF 
CONTRAcrs §§ 515-516 (1932); 6A ARlHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
§ 1394 (1962); Annotation, Enforceability ofRestrictive Covenant, Ancillary to Employ­
ment Contract, as Affected by Territorial Extent of Restriction, 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 116 
(1955). 
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the covenant is too encompassing in time, in area, or in any other 
respect, only those portions that can be severed and are reasonable 
will be enforced.66 Finally, an employer cannot use an employment 
contract to restrain "ordinary competition," which occurs when an 
employee is rightfully terminated and takes the expertise of the 
trade acquired while working for the former employer and applies 
these skills for the benefit of a new employer, often a rival in the 
trade of the former employer.67 
When an employer terminates employment in contravention of 
the employment contract, any restrictive covenants included in the 
contract cannot be enforced.68 The issue of whether restrictive cov­
enants included in a wrongfully terminated employment contract 
may be enforced was raised in Ward v. American Mutual Liability 
Insurance CO.69 In Ward, the plaintiffs signed a written employ­
ment contract which provided that termination could only occur on 
the anniversary of employment.7o When the defendant required 
employees to sign a new contract after ten years of service or be 
terminated, the plaintiffs refused to sign and were subsequently ter­
minated.71 The terminated employees filed suit against American 
Mutual for breach of the employment contract.72 In response, 
American Mutual asserted that the plaintiffs violated the non-com­
petition clause of the contract, which provided "that the employee, 
for a period of eighteen months following termination of employ­
ment, would not procure, solicit, accept or refer applications or in­
quiries about insurance from persons insured by the defendant ... 
under a policy sold or serviced by the employee. "73 The court held 
for the plaintiffs because, applying contract principles, the breach 
terminated the non-competition obligations of the contract.74 
Thus, an employer may protect its interests through the use of 
a restrictive covenant, so long as that employer does not terminate 
the employee in contravention of the employment contract. Simi­
66. See All Stainless, 364 Mass. at 778, 308 N.E.2d at 485. 
67. See Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 263 Mass. 223, 226-27, 160 N.E. 804, 806 
(1928) ("[A]n employer cannot by contract prevent his employee from using the skill 
and intelligence acquired or increased and improved through experience or through 
instruction received in the course of the employment."). 
68. See Ward v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 98, 101, 443 
N.E.2d 1342, 1344 (1983). 
69. 15 Mass. App. Ct. 98, 443 N.E.2d 1342 (1983). 
70. See id. at 99, 443 N.E.2d at 1343. 
71. See id., 443 N.E.2d at 1342-43. 
72. See id. at 98, 443 N.E.2d at 1342. 
73. Id. at 99, 443 N.E.2d at 1342. 
74. See id. at 101, 443 N.E.2d at 1344. 
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larly, although not necessarily required, an employer may protect 
its interests in trade secrets through the use of an express 
agreement. 
2. Protecting Trade Secrets 
A trade secret is defined as "any information that can be used 
in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is suffi­
ciently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic 
advantage over others."75 In Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton,76 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted the six factor 
test set forth in the Restatement of Torts for defining the term trade 
secret.77 Therefore, when determining whether a piece of informa­
tion qualifies as a trade secret, a c,ourt in Massachusetts must con­
sider the following factors: 
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the 
business, (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and 
others involved in the business, (3) the extent of measures taken 
by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information, (4) the 
value of the information to the employer and to his competitors, 
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the employer in 
developing the information, and (6) the ease or difficulty with 
which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated 
by others.78 
If a piece of information is found to be a trade secret, it may 
not be disclosed by the employee, even in the absence of an express 
.~greement.79 Nevertheless, in order to protect its trade secrets and 
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). There has 
been an effort made to use a uniform trade secret law. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). The uniform act defines a trade secret as 
information, including formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, or process that: (i) derives independent economic value, 
actual or potential, from not being generally known to and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic 
value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are rea­
sonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). However, this 
Act has not been adopted in Massachusetts. 
76. 361 Mass. 835, 282 N.E.2d 921 (1972). 
77. See id. at 840, 282 N.E.2d at 925. 
78. Id. at 840, 282 N.E.2d at 925. 
79. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 42 (1996). Section 42 reads as follows: 
Whoever embezzles, steals or unlawfully takes, carries away, conceals, or cop­
ies, or by fraud or by deception obtains, from any person or corporation, with 
intent to convert to his own use, any trade secret, regardless of value, shall be 
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other confidential information, the employer's best course of action 
is to define an·employee's obligation to maintain confidences and 
secrets of the employer through the use of a written agreement.80 
3. Protecting Patents and Copyrights 
Similarly, the "shop right" doctrine allows employers to use 
patents and copyrights that were developed by employees while us­
ing the employer's resources.81 However, if the employer desires 
absolute ownership in the patent(s), an express agreement to that 
effect must be signed by the employee-inventor.82 Otherwise, the 
employer is merely accorded a non-exclusive right to practice the 
invention once a patent is obtained by the employee, and the em­
ployer is not entitled to a conveyance of the invention.83 Histori­
cally, "such agreements have been construed somewhat strictly 
against the employer;"84 therefore, an employer must use caution 
when drafting this type of agreement. Once again, the conservative 
approach, as part of an employment agreement, is to include spe­
cific terms making the employer the owner of patents and copy­
rights created in the course of employment and thereby preventing 
disagreement and litigation in the future. Unfortunately, even if 
employers follow the suggestions put forth in this Article, problems 
may still arise within the employment relationship. In the event of 
disagreements between the employer and the employee, an arbitra­
liable in tort to such person or corporation for all damages resulting 
therefrom. 
Id.; see also Eastern Marble Prods. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 372 Mass. 835, 841: 
364 N.E.2d 799,803 (1977) ("It is settled by our cases that the duty of an employee not 
to disclose confidential information is grounded on 'basic principles of equity' ... and 
upon an implied contract, growing out of the nature of the employer-employee 
relation."). 
80. See Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc., 409 Mass. 165, 172,565 N.E.2d 415, 419 (1991) 
("If an employer wishes to restrict the post-employment competitive activities of a key 
employee, it may seek that goal through a non-competition agreement."). 
81. The "shop right" rule is defined as follows: "In patent law, the right of an 
employer to use employee's invention in employer's business without payment of roy­
alty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 961 (6th ed~ 1990). 
82. See Dalzell v. Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. 315, 320 (1893); see also 
American Circular Loom Co. v. Wilson, 198 Mass. 182, 202, 84 N.E. 133, 135 (1908). 
83. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 189 (1933); see 
also American Circular, 198 Mass. at 202,84 N.E. at 135. 
84. American Circular, 198 Mass. at 202, 84 N.E. at 136; see also Hildreth v. Duff, 
143 F. 139, 140 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1906) ("The terms of [such a contract] should be so 
precise as that neither party could reasonably misunderstand them." (quoting Colson v. 
Thompson, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) 336,341 (1817». 
115 1999] LANGUAGE THAT LIMITS LIABILITY 
tion clause that was initially set forth in the employment agreement 
would serve to protect the employer's interests. 
4. Arbitration 
An important section of an employment agreement, for pur­
poses of protecting the employer, is a clause requiring that all em­
ployment-related disputes be arbitrated. The Federal Arbitration 
Act, enacted in 1925, then reenacted and codified in 1947 as Title 9 
of the United States Code, governs the arbitration process and pro­
cedures.85 "Its purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial 
hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English com­
mon law and had been adopted by American courts and to place 
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts."86 
Further, 9 U.S.c. § 3 grants stays of proceedings in federal district 
courts when an issue in the proceeding should be arbitrated.87 Sec­
tion 4 of Title 9 provides "for orders compelling arbitration when 
one party has failed, neglected, or refused to comply with an arbi­
tration agreement."88 "These provisions manifest a 'liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements."'89 
In Massachusetts, it is preferable for employers to resolve 
claims through arbitration, especially in the context of discrimina­
tion claims, which allow employees to seek unlimited damages 
before a jury.90 Fortunately for employers, the trend in Massachu­
setts is to favor enforceability of arbitration agreements. In 
Mugnano-Bornstein v. Crowell,91 the plaintiff signed an arbitration 
agreement as part of her employment contract.92 She was later ter­
minated for insubordination and subsequently filed a complaint in 
superior court alleging sexual harassment and gender discrimina­
tion.93 The defendants filed a motion to stay court proceedings and 
to compel enforcement of the arbitration agreement, which the 
85. Act of July 30,1947, ch.392, § 1,61 Stat. 669 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.c. 
§§ 1-307 (1994»; see also Massachusetts Arbitration Act, MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, 
§§ 1-19 (1996). 
86. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); see also 
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20, 220 n.6 (1985); Scherk v. 
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 & n.4 (1974). 
87. See 9 U.S.c. § 3; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25. 
88. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25; see also 9 U.S.c. § 4. 
89. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hasp. v. Mercury Con­
str. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983». 
90. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 5 (1996). 
91. 42 Mass. App. Ct. 347, 677 N.E.2d 242 (1997). 
92. See id. at 348,677 N.E.2d at 244. 
93. See id., 677 N.E.2d at 244. 
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court granted.94 At the arbitration hearing, the plaintiff's claims 
were unanimously denied and dismissed.95 The plaintiff petitioned 
the court to revoke the stay and in response the defendants re­
quested enforcement of the arbitration findings.96 The superior 
court, citing a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, reversed the stay and found that the plaintiff 
did not knowingly waive her rights to a jury tria1.97 However, on 
appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the ar­
bitration agreement was binding and that the plaintiff had waived 
all claims, including discrimination claims.98 The Supreme Judicial 
Court refused to adopt the "knowing waiver" requirement of the 
Ninth Circuit, thus recognizing the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements.99 
Language that compels employees to arbitrate all employment 
disputes has become more popular in recent years. The leading 
case in this area is Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corpora­
tion.1°O In Gilmer, the defendant hired the plaintiff as a "Manager 
of Financial Services" in May of 1981.101 The plaintiff was required, 
as a condition of his employment, to register as a securities repre­
sentative with several stock exchanges, including the New York 
Stock Exchange ("NYSE").102 In 1987, at the age of 62, the plain­
tiff was released from his job. He claimed the release was age re­
lated.103 When the plaintiff initiated proceedings against his former 
employer in the United States District Court for the Western Divi­
sion of North Carolina, under the Age Discrimination in Employ­
94. See id., 677 N.E.2d at 244. 
95. See id. at 349, 677 N.E.2d at 244. 
96. See id., 677 N.E.2d at 244. 
97. See id., 677 N.E.2d at 244 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 
1299 (9th Cir. 1994». Although Prudential Insurance was 
decided after the original order compelling arbitration, the judge ruled that 
"an employee must knowingly agree to arbitrate discrimination claims under 
G.L. c. 151B in order to waive her right to trial," and that the plaintiff "could 
not have known that she was waiving her statutory right to a trial on her sex­
ual harassment and discrimination claims" when she signed the application for 
employment containing the arbitration agreement. 
Id., 677 N.E.2d at 244 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 
1994». 
98. See id. at 353, 677 N.E.2d at 247. 
99. See id. at 352, 677 N.E.2d at 246. 
100. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
101. Id. at 23. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. 
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ment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"),104 the defendant filed a motion to 
compel arbitration based on a provision of the application com­
pleted for the NYSE.1°5 The relevant application provision re­
quired arbitration of "[a]ny controversy between a registered 
representative and any member or member organization arising out 
of the employment or termination of employment of such regis­
tered representative."l06 
The majority opinion in Gilmer recognized that there may be 
an inequality in bargaining power when parties enter into an em­
ployment contract.107 The Court decided, however, that this ine­
quality is "not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration 
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context. "108 
Thus, an employer can ensure the enforceability of an arbitration 
provision by confirming that the clause providing for arbitration 
reaches all the areas intended to be subject to arbitration.109 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a dissenting 
opinion in the Gilmer case.110 In his dissent, Justice Stevens de­
clared that the Court's majority opinion barely touched upon the 
antecedent issue of "whether the coverage of the Act even extends 
to arbitration clauses contained in employment contracts, regard­
less of the subject matter of the claim at issue."l11 Justice Stevens 
detailed portions of the history of the Federal Arbitration Act and 
also quoted the chairman of the American Bar Association commit­
tee that was responsible for drafting the bill.112 The chairman had 
assured the Senators by stating that the bill "is not intended [to] be 
an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give 
the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agree­
ing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do 
104. 29 U.S.c. §§ 621-634 (1994). 
105. See Gilmer, 500 u.s. at 24. 
106. Id. at 23. 
107. See id. at 33. 
108. Id. 
109. See Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Central Life Assur. Co., 85 F.3d 21, 28 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (providing that the strong federal policy favoring arbitration will only extend 
its reach into scopes of arbitration which are written into individual agreements). In 
addition, some jurisdictions may require arbitration, even where the agreement does 
not specifically call for it. See Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 
867 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1989) ("Indeed, the heavy presumption of arbitrability re­
quires that when the scope of the arbitration clause is open to question, a court must 
decide the question in favor of arbitration."). 
110. Gilmer, 500 u.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
111. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
112. See id. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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it."113 While it is true that merchants have the right and privilege of 
sitting down and bargaining on equal footing, there is a definite ine­
quality of bargaining power between an employer and a potential 
employee. The employer lays down the offer and the terms of the 
employment agreement; the potential employee has no choice but 
to accept the terms of the agreement or surrender the opportunity 
to work. Therefore, employment contracts are not entered into on 
equal bargaining terms, and the employee may be forced to give up 
his or her right to have the case litigated by a court.1l4 Nonetheless, 
the majority view of the Supreme Court is that the unequal bargain­
ing positions of those entering into employment contracts does not 
render arbitration agreements per se unenforceable.1lS 
V. 	 EMPLOYMENT MANUALS AND POLICIES AND THEIR EFFECT 
ON THE GENERAL RULE OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT 
Absent contractual terms to the contrary, the general rule in 
Massachusetts is that employees are presumed to be employed at­
will, and thus that the employment relationship can be terminated 
by either party at any time.1l6 As a result, in any written statements 
regarding the employment relationship, there should be no refer­
ences to "permanent employees" or any other use of the word "per­
manent." The word "permanent" should be replaced with the word 
"regular" in an attempt to avoid the inference of employment for 
life.1l7 
When dealing with an at-will employment relationship, it is not 
generally necessary that an employer have "good cause" to dis­
113. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before 
the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Congo 9 (1923». 
114. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
115. See id. at 33. 
116. See Jackson V. Boston Community Dev., Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 9, 525 N.E.2d 411, 
412 (1988) ("As a general rule, where an employment contract ... contains no definite 
period of employment, it establishes employment at will."); see also Upton V. Busi­
nessIand, 425 Mass. 756, 757, 682 N.E.2d 1357, 1358 (1997) ("The general rule is that an 
at-will employee may be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason at 
all. "). 
117. In addition, employers should avoid references to fixed periods of time, such 
as annual salaries or specific examples of times for discipline or suspension because 
these may impose additional burdens on the employer. Similarly, references to a "pro­
bationary period" should be changed to "nonregular" with respect to reasons for disci­
pline or termination because at the end of a "probationary period," an employee could 
reasonably argue that they should be considered "permanent" and entitled to lifetime 
employment. 
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charge an employee.118 Only when the discharge of an at-will em­
ployee is against public policy does a claim for breach of a covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing arise.119 The following are examples 
of discharges of an employee that were found to be against public 
policy. In Montalvo v. Zamora,120 an employer discharged an em­
ployee because the employee hired an attorney to negotiate his 
claim that the employer violated the minimum wage law.121 In 
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehouseman & Helpers, Local 396,122 an employee was dis­
charged for refusing to commit perjury before a government com­
mission.123 In Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 124 the plaintiff 
was discharged for filing a worker's compensation claim.125 Aside 
from at-will terminations that are against public policy, like those 
mentioned above, it appears that in at-will employment relation­
ships involving commissions, employers can only terminate employ­
ees entitled to commissions for good faith reasons.126 
In determining whether an employment contract is for a spe­
cific duration such that the inference of "at-will" employment is re­
118. See Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300,303,431 N.E.2d 908, 910 (1982) 
(citing Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981». 
119. See id., 431 N.E.2d at 910. 
120. 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). 
121. See id. at 402. 
122. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
123. See id. at 27-28. 
124. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). 
125. See id. at 426. 
126. See RLM Assocs., Inc. v. Carter Mfg. Corp., 356 Mass. 718, 248 N.E.2d 646 
(1969); see also Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 
(1977). In RLM Associates, Carter, the employer, fired its representative, RLM, shortly 
before Carter was awarded a contract which was discovered and brought to its attention 
by RLM. See RLM Assocs., 356 Mass. at 718, 248 N.E.2d at 646. The awarding of the 
contract would have required Carter to pay a commission to RLM. See id., 248 N.E.2d 
at 646. 
In Fortune, a cash register salesman was discharged by his employer shortly after 
he completed a sale worth $5,000,000, of which he was to receive a contractual bonus of 
$92,079. See Fortune, 373 Mass. at 98-99, 364 N.E.2d at 1254. Fortune only received 
75% of the bonus due on the sale and the remaining 25% of the bonus was paid to a 
systems and installations person, contrary to the company's usual policy of paying only 
the salesperson a bonus. See id. at 99, 364 N.E.2d at 1254. The court decided that 
"where the principal seeks to deprive the agent of all compensation by terminating the 
contractual relationship when the agent is on the brink of successfully completing the 
sale, the principal has acted in bad faith and the ensuing transaction between the princi­
pal and the buyer is to be regarded as having been accomplished by the agent." Id. at 
104-05, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. The court then added that "the same result obtains where 
the principal attempts to deprive the agent of any portion of a commission due the 
agent." Id., 364 N.E.2d at 1257. 
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butted, courts will evaluate the actual language of the contract and 
various other employment related documents as well as the circum­
stances that existed between the parties when said documents were 
executed. 
A. Determining Whether a Contract Is for a Specific Term 
In Frederick v. Conagra, Inc. ,127 the court found that whether 
certain documents amounted to a contract of employment for a spe­
cific term was an issue of fact that must be resolved at trial.128 In 
Frederick, the United States District Court for the District of Mas­
sachusetts held that a letter confirming an annual salary and indi­
cating that the employer agreed to cancel a loan after two years of 
employment was sufficient for the jury to find that a two-year em­
ployment contract existed.129 
In a similar case, Kravetz v. Merchants Distributors, Inc. ,130 the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a motion for a di­
rected verdict was improper because the jury could have found that 
a contract was for a specific term and was not terminable at-will.131 
The court stated that "'[w]hether there is a contract for services for 
a definite period of time ... depends upon all the attendant condi­
tions surrounding the agreement, as well as upon its terms, when 
the latter are not specific and clear."'132 When an employment con­
tract is unclear in terms of the duration of employment "it [is] 
proper for the jury to refer not only to the contract language but 
also to the attendant circumstances, including 'the nature of the em­
ployment, ... the prior negotiation[s], [and] the situation of the 
127. 713 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass 1989). 
128. See id. at 46. In Frederick, the employer offered a position to the plaintiff 
with an oral representation that Frederick was being hired for at least two years. See id. 
at 43. An employment contract was never signed, and less than three months after the 
plaintiff began working for the defendant, after the plaintiff had relocated his family 
from Buffalo, New York to Massachusetts, he was fired on thirty days notice for no 
stated cause. See id. The plaintiff brought a claim for breach of employment contract 
based not on a written employment agreement but on various representations and ne­
gotiations between the parties which induced Frederick to leave his former job and join 
the employer's company. See id. at 44-45. Such representations and negotiations were 
found by the court to be questions of material fact, which were genuinely in dispute 
when determining whether an agreement for employment for a specific term had ex­
isted. See id. at 46. 
129. See id. 
130. 387 Mass. 457, 440 N.E.2d 1278 (1982). 
131. See id. at 460, 440 N.E.2d at 1280. 
132. [d., 440 N.E.2d at 1280 (alteration in original) (quoting Maynard v. Royal 
Worcester Corset Co., 200 Mass. 1,4, 85 N.E. 877, 878 (1908)). 
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parties.' "133 
B. 	 Determining Whether Handbooks Create an Express or 
Implied Contract 
Employers must use caution in drafting employee handbooks, 
as certain language may alter the presumption of at-will employ­
ment. In determining whether an employee handbook constitutes 
an employment contract, Massachusetts courts have looked at the 
following factors which are collectively known as the Jackson test: 
(i) whether the employer retained the right to unilaterally change 
the employment manual; (ii) whether the employee ever negotiated 
any of the terms; (iii) whether a specific term of employment was 
stated in the manual; (iv) whether the employee signed the manual 
or manifested his assent to it or acknowledged that he understood 
its terms; (v) whether any special attention was given the manual by 
the employer; and (vi) whether the manual was merely intended to 
provide guidance or actual obligations.134 
Recent Massachusetts cases have relied on the Jackson test 
when determining whether a handbook created contractual terms. 
For example, in Biggins v. Hazen Paper CO.,135 the court held that 
the absence of two elements of the Jackson test was fatal for the 
plaintiff.136 The plaintiff argued that the employment handbook 
created an express contract, and in the alternative, an implied con­
tract.137 The plaintiff had been terminated and wanted to receive 
payment for his accrued vacation time which he was entitled to pur­
suant to a provision in the employee handbook.138 The court held 
that since the plaintiff had no opportunity to negotiate the terms of 
the handbook and no special attention was given to the handbook 
133. Id., 440 N.E.2d at 1280 (alterations in original) (quoting Mahoney v. Hil­
dreth & Rogers Co., 332 Mass. 496, 498, 125 N.E.2d 788, 790 (1955». 
134. See Jackson v. Action for Boston Community Dev., Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 525 
N.E.2d 411 (1988). In Jackson, the employee contended that he entered into an em­
ployment contract with his employer based on terms which were established by a "Per­
sonnel Policies Manual" distributed by the employer. Id. at 8, 525 N.E.2d at 412. The 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached this employment contract by discharging 
him in a manner which did not comport with the grievance procedure outlined in the 
personnel manual. The court considered several factors in reaching a decision that the 
conduct and relation of the parties "fell short of that which would allow a jury to decide 
reasonably that the parties had entered an implied contract based on the manual's 
terms." Id. at 15,525 N.E.2d at 416. 
135. 	 953 F.2d 1405 (1st Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
136. 	 See id. at 1423-24. 
137. 	 See id. at 1422. 
138. 	 See id. 
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by the employer, there was neither an express nor an implied con­
tract, and therefore, no breach existed.B9 Likewise, in Mullen v. 
Ludlow Hospital,140 the court held that an employment manual did 
not create an employment contract and that the plaintiff was, ac­
cordingly, an at-will employee.141 The court reasoned as follows: 
There was no agreement, written or oral, specifying a definite 
period of employment. While there was an employment manual, 
it did riot form the basis of a contract because the plaintiff did not 
negotiate its terms and received it only after he began working. 
In addition, the manual, by its own terms, declared [that] it was 
not a contract and that the Hospital could change the terms 
unilaterally.142 
The cases on this point seem to favor the employer in that a plaintiff 
arguing that an employment manual forms the basis of a contract 
will be required to meet all factors of the Jackson test in order to 
prevail. 
C. The Effect of Disclaimers in Employment Manuals 
Finally, in order to strengthen an employer's argument that a 
handbook does not form the basis of a contract, the employment 
handbook should contain a strong contract disclaimer.143 Disclaim­
ers run the gamut from simple one sentence references that the 
handbook is not a contract and that all employment is at-will to the 
much more detailed. The following is an example of a detailed 
disclaimer: 
The policies stated in this Handbook are intended as guide­
lines only and are subject to change at the sole discretion of the 
Company. This Handbook should not be construed as and does 
not constitute a contract guaranteeing employment for any spe­
cific duration. Although we hope that your employment rela­
tionship with us is long-term, either you or the Company may 
terminate this relationship at any time, for any reason, with or 
without cause or notice. Please understand that no supervisor, 
manager, or representative of XYZ other than the [e.g., Presi­
dent], has the authority to enter into any agreement with you for 
139. See id. at 1423. 
140. 32 Mass. App. Ct. 968, 592 N.E.2d 1342 (1992). 
141. See id. at 969, 592 N.E.2d at 1344. 
142. Id., 592 N.E.2d at 1344 (citation omitted). 
143. See id., 592 N.E.2d at 1344 (noting that a disclaimer within the employment 
manual, which provided that the manual was not a contract, was a factor in the courts 
determination of at-will employment). 
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employment for any specified period of time or to make any 
promises or commitments contrary to the foregoing. Further, 
any employment agreement entered into by the [e.g., President] 
shall not be enforceable unless it is in writing.144 
When an employer uses a detailed disclaimer, including lan­
guage equivalent to that quoted above, little room is left for the 
employee to argue that the employment relationship is anything 
other than at-will. Thus, the employer's risk that a court will rule 
that an employment contract existed and attribute to the employer 
additional, unforeseen obligations in the employment relationship 
is thereby reduced. For example, in Seeley v. Prime Computer, 
Inc. ,145 when the plaintiff argued that the employment manual cre­
ated a contract, the Massachusetts Appeals Court disagreed and 
held that the employment manual in question did not create a con­
tract due to an express disclaimer contained therein.146 
In Seeley, the plaintiff took a leave of absence due to a mental 
disability and received payments from the defendant.147 After sev­
eral months, the defendant required the plamtiff to undergo an­
other psychological examination to determine if she could return to 
work.148 The defendant felt that the plaintiff was able to come back 
to work, but the plaintiff refused to take the same job she had prior 
to her leave of absence.149 The defendant subsequently terminated 
her employment. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract relying 
on the employment manual's clause "which included, in its terms 
and conditions, both short and long term disability benefits. "150 
The court reasoned that the employment manual did not constitute 
a contract: 
The Employee Handbook upon which Mrs. Seeley relies contains 
a disclaimer on page one which clearly states that the Handbook 
cannot be construed as a contract between Prime and its employ­
ees; that the policies and procedures set forth do not constitute 
conditions of employment; and that Prime reserved the right uni­
laterally to "modify, revoke, suspend, terminate or change any or 
all such plans, policies or procedures in whole or in part at any 
144. ROBERT J. NOBILE, GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS § 3.06[2] (1992 ed.). 
145. 1990 Mass. App. Div. 132 (1990). 
146. See id. at 134. 
147. See id. at 132. 
148. See id. at 133. 
149. See id. 
150. Id. 
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time without notice."151 
Although most employment manuals contain disclaimer lan­
guage providing that the manual does not constitute a contract, 
problems still arise when the employment manual requires the em­
ployer to follow established guidelines in order to discipline or ter­
minate employees.i52 "[I]n certain limited situations, an employer's 
discharge of an at-will employee may give rise to a cause of action 
for wrongful discharge such as where the at-will status of the em­
ployee is altered by the terms of an employee handbook ...."153 
When the employer is found to be liable for breach of an at-will 
employment contract based on violations of an employee hand­
book, the employee is entitled to back pay and reinstatement to his 
or her former employment position.154 
D. 	 The Effect of Severance and Reemployment Right Clauses in 
Employment Manuals 
An employer may encounter problems if it chooses to describe 
severance and reemployment rights in its employment manua1.155 
151. 	 Id. at 134. 
152. See generally Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 388 S.E.2d 808 (S.c. 1990). Small 
was employed as a spinner by Springs for a period of eight years. See id. at 810. During 
Small's employment, Springs utilized an employee handbook which set out a four step 
procedure for discharging employees. See id. Small was not discharged in accordance 
with the handbook's four step procedure and filed her action for breach of contract, 
claiming that her at-will employment status was altered by the provisions of the em­
ployee handbook. See id. 
153. 	 [d. (citing Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 357 S.E.2d 452 (S.c. 1987». 
154. 	 See id. at 814 (Littlejohn, J., concurring and dissenting). 
155. See generally Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 356 A.2d 221 (Md. 1976). Brunswick 
had both written and unwritten policies and practices which were followed regarding 
severance and vacation pay. See id. at 223. An unwritten practice which Brunswick 
followed regarding entitlement to severance pay was that two weeks' salary would be 
paid to an employee if they were not given two weeks' prior notice of termination. See 
id. On September 17, 1971, Brunswick agreed to sell its Concorde Yacht Division·to 
Test Corporation. As part of the agreement, Brunswick was not able to induce or to 
recruit personnel of the Concorde Division to remain in the employ of Brunswick. Fur­
ther, Test Corporation was required to continue Brunswick's policies with respect to 
severance and vacation pay. See id. at 224. The plaintiffs accepted positions with Test 
Corporation and were paid the same salaries that they received from Brunswick. Test 
Corporation also continued Brunswick's policies with respect to severance pay, vaca­
tion pay, and two weeks pay in lieu of prior notice of termination. See id. However, on 
April 27, 1972, Test Corporation closed its doors on account of insolvency. After Test 
Corporation closed its doors, the plaintiffs filed suit to recover lost compensation from 
Brunswick. See id. The trial court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to severance 
pay based on the meaning of the policy statement, but that the plaintiffs were barred 
from recovery because they entered into a novation with Test Corporation and this 
novation released Brunswick from its responsibility to compensate the plaintiffs. See id. 
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An employment manual that addresses severance and reemploy­
ment rights may be held to alter the at-will status of an employment 
agreement, creating a "contractual obligation[ ] when, with knowl­
edge of their existence, employees start or continue to work for the 
employer."156 Moreover, some jurisdictions have concluded that 
employee handbooks or policy manuals containing express or im­
plied promises may create a binding contract.157 
Courts have also held that policy statements indicating that laid 
off employees would be given first opportunity to fill new job open­
ings are enforceable against the employer.158 When a company has 
at 227. The Court of Appeals of Maryland disagreed with the trial court and found that 
a novation did not exist and that the employees were entitled to compensation from 
Brunswick. See id. at 228, 230. 
156. Id. at 224. 
157. See Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 371 S.E.2d 46, 52 (W. Va. 1988) (citing 
Cook v. Heck's Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986». In Collins, the plaintiff alleged 
"that he had been laid off and subse'quently discharged by [Elkay] in retaliation for his 
refusal to 'falsify certain safety reports' pertaining to a safety inspection at [Elkay's] 
preparation plant where he was employed, and for his refusal to otherwise violate fed­
eral or State mine safety laws." Id. at 47. Aside from the wrongful discharge claim 
based on a violation of public policy, the employee brought a breach of contract claim 
against his employer. See id. at 51-52. The breach of contract claim was based on the 
employee's belief that he was to hold his position until retirement, so long as he per­
formed his job duties competently and satisfactorily. See id. at 51. Collins alleged that 
said belief was a result of various publications of Elkay, which promised him and his 
family financial security until retirement. See id. The court stated the following: 
A promise of job security contained in an employee handbook distributed by 
an employer to its employees constitutes an offer for a unilateral contract; and 
an employee's continuing to work, while under no obligation to do so, consti­
tutes an acceptance and sufficient consideration to make the employer's prom­
ise binding and enforceable . 
. . . An employee handbook may form the basis of a unilateral contract if 
there is a definite promise therein by the employer not to discharge covered 
employees except for specified reasons. 
Id. However, the dissenting justice in Collins noted that "[e]ven in states that recognize 
implied employment contracts, an agreement for 'satisfactory performance' is not en­
forceable because it is a purely subjective term measured by the employer." Id. at 52 
(Brotherton, J., dissenting). 
158. See Hepp v. Lockheed-Cal. Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 408, 410-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1978). Hepp was employed by Lockheed as a "Procurement Price Cost Administrator, 
Labor Grade 7," a salaried position which was considered management. Id. at 409. 
After working in the procurement department for over nine years, Hepp's group was 
"surplused" and he was "laid off suitable for rehire." Id. Hepp was told that the layoff 
was caused by an excessive number of workers and had no reflection on his work qual­
ity, and that he would eventually be called back to work. See id. Lockheed had a well­
established policy of hiring back those employees who were laid off within the past two 
years and were qualified for the recently-vacated position before Lockheed would fill 
the position by promotion, transfer within the company, or by a new employee. See id. 
However, during the two year period following Hepp's layoff, six openings occurred for 
which Hepp was qualified and each time Lockheed overlooked Hepp's availability. See 
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a well-established policy for rehiring former/laid-off employees, the 
policy will be deemed "not merely a guideline for the benefit of 
management but a positive inducement for employees to take and 
continue employment with [the company]."lS9 Any necessary con­
sideration to be given by the employee in order for a contract to be 
formed would manifest itself in employees foregoing their rights to 
seek other employment based on the representations made in the 
form of employer policies.160 Accordingly, it is recommended that 
severance and reemployment clauses not be included in employee 
handbooks. 
Courts often rely on written materials provided by the em­
ployer to its employees when finding that contractual terms exist in 
an employment relationship. A court need not, however, limit itself 
only to written documents to determine the existence of an employ­
ment agreement. In certain instances, courts may also look to the 
words or actions of the parties when determining whether an em­
ployment contract exists between the employer and the employee. 
VI. ORAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACfS 
In general, all contracts must be in writing.161 However, a con­
tract may also be created orally, so long as the contract is not for a 
fixed term greater than one year.162 Courts have defined the "per­
id. Hepp sued for breach of the layoff policy and Lockheed defended, arguing that the 
"policies ... are not a part of plaintiffs employment contract because they are not 
intended for his benefit and he did not give consideration for them." Id. 
159. Id. at 411. 
160. See id. 
161. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 259, § 1 (1996). Section 1 provides the 
following: 
No action shall be brought: 
First, to charge an executor or administrator, or an assignee under an insolvent 
law of the commonwealth, upon a special promise to answer damages out of 
his own estate; 
Second, to charge a person upon a special promise to answer for the debt, 
default or misdoings of another; 
Third, upon an agreement made upon consideration of marriage; 
Fourth, upon a contract for the sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments or of 
any interest in or concerning them; or 
Fifth, upon an agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the 
making thereof; 
Unless the promise, contract or agreement upon which such action is brought, 
or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to 
be charged therewith or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized. 
Id. 
162. See CORBIN, supra note 1, § 444, at 446 (noting that the Statute of Frauds 
provides that "[nlo action shall be brought ... upon any agreement that is not to be 
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formance within one year" provision such that an employer should 
proceed with caution when making oral promises to a present or 
prospective employee. 
For instance, in Whelan v. Integraph Corp. ,163 the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that an 
oral lifetime employment contract is not barred by the Statute of 
Frauds. l64 In Whelan, the defendant strongly recruited the plaintiff 
to be its New England district manager.165 During the recruitment 
process, the prospective employee, who was now the plaintiff, was 
assured that "he could count on a long-term commitment from the 
defendant."166 The plaintiff accepted the job offer and was subse­
quently terminated six months later.167 The plaintiff then sued, al­
leging that the employer breached the lifetime employment 
contract.168 The defendant, however, argued that the contract was 
unenforceable because it was both for a term longer than one year 
and not in writing.169 However, the court held that the Statute of 
Frauds did not apply because the contract could have been per­
formed within one year.170 The court supported its holding by not­
ing that "[b]ecause [the plaintiff's] contract was for permanent 
employment, it could have been performed within one year: [the 
plaintiff] could have died or [the defendant] could have discontin­
ued its business, at which point its obligation to employ [the plain­
tiff] would end. "171 
However, it is quite different when the oral contract states a 
specific time at which the employment will end. In Powers v. Bos­
ton Cooper Corp.,172 the oral contract began in 1960 when the 
plaintiff was thirty two years 01d.173 The oral contract established 
that the plaintiff would work for the defendant until the age of sev­
performed within the space of one year from the making thereof" (alteration in 
original». 
163. 889 F. Supp. 15 (D. Mass. 1995). 
164. See id. at 17. See supra note 162 for the relevant language of the Statute of 
Frauds. 
165. See id. 
166. Id. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. 
169. See id. 
170. See id. 
171. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Boothby v. Texon, Inc., 414 Mass. 468, 
479, 608 N.E.2d 1028, 1035-36 (1993». 
172. 926 F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1991). 
173. See id. at 110. 
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enty.174 The plaintiff, however, was terminated at the age of fifty 
nine.175 The plaintiff then filed suit, alleging that his termination 
before the age of seventy was a breach of the oral employment con­
tractp6 The court held that since the contract could not have been 
performed in one year, the contract was unenforceable pursuant to 
the Statute of Frauds.177 Thus, where an oral contract is general in 
nature, the contract will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
However, when the contract specifies a specific period of employ­
ment, the contract must be in writing. 
Employment relationships often bring exceptions to the Stat­
ute of Frauds into play. The first exception worth noting is the 
Doctrine of Promissory EstoppelP8 Massachusetts courts first rec­
ognized this doctrine in Cellucci v. Sun COP9 In Cellucci, the court 
recognized three elements for finding promissory estoppel: 
(1) [a] representation or conduct amounting to a representation 
intended to induce a course of conduct on the part of the person 
to whom the representation is made; (2) [a]n act or omission re­
sulting from the representation, whether actual or by conduct, by 
the person to whom the representation is made; [and] (3) 
[d]etriment to such person as a consequence of the act or 
omission.180 
This three-part test has since been applied in the context of employ­
ment relationships.181 In Hoffman v. Optima Systems, Inc.,182 the 
174. See id. 
175. See id. 
176. See id. 
177. See id. at 111. 
178. "A promise which the promisor would reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the 
action of forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the statute of frauds if injustice 
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is 
to be limited as justice requires." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(1) 
(1981). 
179. 2 Mass. App. Ct. 722, 320 N.E.2d 919 (1974). In Cellucci, the plaintiff and 
defendant had negotiated for the sale of a parcel of land, but the defendant subse­
quently purchased from a different vendor. See id. at 723-27, 320 N.E.2d at 921-23. The 
plaintiff then sued for breach of a land sale contract. The defendant claimed the Statute 
of Frauds as an affirmative defense, asserting that since the agreement was not in writ­
ing it was unenforceable. See id. at 727, 320 N.E.2d at 923. The court found the con­
tract to be enforceable based on the plaintiff's reliance on statements made by the 
defendant. See id. at 729, 320 N.E.2d at 924. 
180. Id. at 728, 320 N.E.2d at 923. 
181. See generally Frederick v. Conagra, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass. 1989); 
Hoffman v. Optima Sys., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 865 (D. Mass. 1988); Presto v. Sequoia Sys., 
Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Mass. 1986). 
182. 683 F. Supp. 865 (D. Mass. 1988). 
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plaintiff worked for Polaroid when the defendants approached him 
to work for their company.183 The plaintiff was promised that he 
would be "Vice President of Engineering and would be a full princi­
pal of Optima."I84 The plaintiff, relying on that promise, resigned 
from Polaroid and accepted the position at Optima,185 During his 
employment at Optima, the plaintiff was not paid the full amount 
for his services rendered, was not paid according to the market 
value for his position, and was not reimbursed for $7,500 worth of 
equipment which he had purchased with his own money for the 
benefit of the company.186 These problems caused him to resign 
and subsequently sue for breach of the employment contract.187 
The defendant moved to dismiss the suit arguing that the contract 
was not in writing and thus violated the Statute of Frauds.188 The 
court refused to dismiss the suit, finding that the "allegations, which 
[were] accepted as true for the purpose of this motion, [were] suffi­
cient to show that Hoffman relied on the promises of Optima ... to 
his detriment. "189 Thus, the court held that the defendants were 
estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense,19o 
The second exception to the Statute of Frauds recognized in 
Massachusetts courts is quantum meruit.191 Quantum meruit is the 
measure of damages used when the plaintiff seeks payment for 
services rendered.192 In order to recover in quantum meruit, one 
must show that (i) the plaintiff bestowed a "measurable" benefit to 
the defendant, (ii) the defendant accepted the benefit bestowed 
"with the expectation of compensating the plaintiff," and (iii) the 
plaintiff expected to be compensated for these services.193 Once 
shown, a plaintiff may recover the value of his services rendered, 
despite a failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds.194 The fact 
183. See id. at 867. 
184. Id. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. 
187. See id. 
188. See id. at 869. 
189. Id. at 870. 
190. See id. 
191. See generally Bolen v. Paragon Plastics, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 103 (D. Mass. 
1990). 
192. See id. at 106. 
193. Id. at 106-07. 
194. See Green v. Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 49-50, 337 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1975), 
abrogated on other grounds by Wilcox v. Trautz, 427 Mass. 326, 693 N.E.2d 141 (1998); 
see also Heil v. McCann, 360 Mass. 507, 511, 275 N.E.2d 889, 892 (1971) ("One who has 
rendered valuable services pursuant to an oral contract, which cannot be enforced on 
account of the statute of frauds, may recover the fair value of the services rendered."). 
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finder will be responsible for determining whether these elements 
have been met.195 Therefore, although employers may often use 
the statute of frauds as a defense to oral contracts, caution must 
nonetheless be employed when engaging in discussions which may 
be perceived as setting forth contractual terms. 
CONCLUSION 
The intricacies of labor and employment law, both at the fed­
eral and state level, dictate that employers must use care to commu­
nicate clearly, fairly, and legally with potential applicants, actual 
applicants, and employees. Various laws concerning the employ­
ment relationship dictate a number of obligations that the employer 
has to current and prospective employees. The employer's failure 
to act in accordance with these various laws may cause unantici­
pated legal liability. However, an employer's best defense may very 
well be a good offense. In this respect, it is crucial that employers 
seek legal counsel before taking any action which has the potential 
to create, affect, alter, or terminate current and future employment 
relationships. 
Advertisements, applications, employment contracts, employ­
ment manuals, and employment procedures can all have a signifi­
cant impact on the employment relationship. From the employer's 
perspective, it is important that the employment relationship be re­
duced to a detailed document which minimizes the potential for un­
certainty and misunderstanding in the future. 
195. See Green, 369 Mass. at 53, 337 N.E.2d at 696. 
